CONFIDENTIALITY, DUE DILIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT IN NIGERIA
By Chidi Ezenwafor, Esq.,MCArb, FIMC
Past Secretary, NBA Abuja Branch
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s Central Bank of Nigeria v Inalegwu Ochife (2025) case recalibrates post-judgment garnishee practice in Nigeria.
The Court condemns indiscriminate, multi-bank garnishee applications.
This represents an attempt to reinforce procedural discipline and prevent third-party harassment.
However, the judgment foregrounds a structural paradox.
It notes pre-commencement due diligence, yet confidentiality doctrine prevents locating a debtor’s accounts without court order.
This doctrine follows Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank (1924) 1 KB 461.
This article examines the jurisprudential consequences of this doctrinal tension.
It evaluates the ‘reasonable belief’ threshold under the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act.
It proposes reforms to reconcile CONFIDENTIALITY, DUE DILIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT IN NIGERIA with effective judgment enforcement.
Introduction
This section introduces the topic of CONFIDENTIALITY, DUE DILIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT IN NIGERIA. It outlines key ideas.
Garnishee proceedings serve as a central enforcement tool in Nigerian civil procedure. They provide a direct route to liquid funds held by third parties, primarily banks, and they enable claimants to reach asset sources without lengthy court orders. This mechanism reflects the practical need to secure debt recovery where funds are not immediately available to the judgment creditor.
However, uneven professional practice has led to widespread filing of ‘shotgun’ garnishee applications. Filers name numerous banks indiscriminately in the hope of locating debtor funds, often without sufficient factual basis.
The Supreme Court’s intervention in CBN v Ochife signals a deliberate judicial effort to reassert the structured purpose of garnishment proceedings, ensuring they target liquid assets with proportionality and clarity. It emphasizes that garnishee orders should align with the debtor’s actual funds and avoid overbroad or abusive practices.
Yet, the judgment exposes an unresolved doctrinal tension: creditors are now expected to demonstrate pre-filing knowledge of specific financial institutions holding debtor funds, while banks are simultaneously prohibited from disclosing such information absent lawful compulsion. The result is an enforcement impasse requiring doctrinal clarification and procedural adaptation.
2.0 CBN v Ochife (2025) and the Re-Definition of Enforcement Prudence
In Ochife, the Supreme Court reiterated that garnishee proceedings are not investigative procedures but enforcement processes triggered by credible indication of indebtedness. Courts must therefore reject speculative or fishing applications. This aligns with prior judicial statements repudiating procedural abuse, including:
• UBA Plc v Access Bank (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1721) 192;
• Guaranty Trust Bank Plc v Innoson (Nig.) Ltd (2022) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1831) 1.
However, the Court did not provide practical frameworks for obtaining the information necessary to meet the diligence threshold—leaving the legal community responsible for reconciling principle and reality.
3.0 The Banker–Customer Confidentiality Barrier
The doctrine of banking confidentiality, as reaffirmed in Diamond Bank Ltd v Opara (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 67 and CBN v Interstella Communications Ltd (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294, prohibits disclosure of account information absent:
1. Customer consent,
2. Statutory exception,
3. Court order, or
4. Public duty grounds.
However, obtaining a court order ordinarily presupposes that the creditor already knows which bank to apply against. Thus emerges the doctrinal circularity:
Disclosure requires judicial compulsion, but judicial compulsion presupposes knowledge of the bank to be compelled.
This is the enforcement paradox Ochife inadvertently intensifies.
4.0 The Statutory Threshold of “Reasonable Belief”
Section 83 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act requires merely a reasonable belief, not certainty, that the garnishee holds funds of the debtor. An interpretation of Ochife requiring proof beyond reasonable inference would therefore:
• Exceed statutory intention,
• Enable strategic evasion by judgment debtors, and
• Reduce monetary judgments to symbolic declarations lacking enforceability.
The Supreme Court’s doctrinal correction should thus be read as restricting recklessness, not foreclosing inference-based diligence.
5.0 Reconciling Confidentiality and Enforcement: Proposed Reform Framework
To balance privacy interests and judicial effectiveness, this article proposes a multi-level policy approach:
5.1 Court-Supervised Account Verification Protocol
The Central Bank of Nigeria should administer a confidential judicial inquiry mechanism permitting courts—not private litigants—to request confirmation of whether a debtor maintains an account with a specified institution. No balance figures need be disclosed at this stage.
5.2 Post-Judgment Debtor Asset Disclosure Orders
Modeled on CPR 71 (England & Wales), debtors should be compelled to disclose assets under oath upon judgment, with non-compliance punishable as contempt.
5.3 Legislative Clarification of “Reasonable Belief”
Amendments to the CPA should codify acceptable evidentiary foundations, including contract payment records, salary routing documentation, and corporate filings.
6.0 Conclusion
The intervention in CBN v Ochife reflects a justified judicial effort to curb procedural abuse and protect third parties from unnecessary litigation burdens. However, the decision’s practical impact will depend on law’s ability to evolve structures that enable creditors to satisfy the due diligence requirement without breaching confidentiality or foreclosing enforceability.
For the Nigerian enforcement system to retain legitimacy, judgment must continue to translate into remedy. Without procedural reform, Ochife risks transforming judicial victories into merely symbolic pronouncements. The path forward lies not in abandoning confidentiality, but in institutionalizing structured judicial access to information necessary for meaningful enforcement.